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We used the results from Financial World’s widely publicized certification contest,
CEO of the Year, to investigate the impact of such contests on firm performance and
executive compensation. A certification contest ranks actors on performance criteria
that key stakeholders accept as credible and legitimate. We found that certified CEOs
received higher compensation than noncertified CEOs when performance was high but
lower remuneration when performance was poor. Although certifications appear to
generate positive abnormal returns when they are first announced, the longer-term
impact of CEO certifications appears to be negative.
Scholars have noted that it is often difficult to
determine whether a firm’s performance is driven
by the excellence of its top management team or by
general economic and organizational conditions
that bear little relation to managerial competence
(e.g., Bok, 1993; Holmstrom, 1982; March, 1984).
Evidence does exist suggesting that top managers
have particular “styles” that are associated with
both financial (e.g., Bertrand & Schoar, 2003) and
organizational (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) pol-
icies. As Holmstrom (1982) argued, however, attri-
butions of managerial ability are noisy and difficult
to make because organizational performance is af-
fected not only by the local decisions of manage-
ment, but also by systematic risk factors operating
at the industry and organizational levels. A firm’s
current good fortune may be the result of a favor-
able industry environment or of the foresight of
managers who have since left the organization.
Conversely, poor performance may stem from un-
controllable economic downturns or corporate de-
terioration inherited from predecessors. These at-
tributional difficulties are compounded by the fact
that top managers may, indeed, have only a limited
impact on their firm’s performance (Lieberson &
O’Connor, 1972; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977). Even
further complicating the matter is research suggest-
ing that managers tend to rationalize past events so
as to cast their actions in the best possible light.
This research has shown that poor company per-
formance is often blamed on uncontrollable exter-
nal events while good performance is credited to
the foresight and quality of management (Bettman
& Weitz, 1983; Salancik & Meindl, 1984). The un-
certainties surrounding the impact of top managers
on their firms imply that it is quite difficult to
evaluate managerial effects in an isolated and indi-
vidualized context.
Under these conditions of evaluative uncer-
tainty, organizational research suggests that social
devices are often invented at a collective level as a
means to assess the abilities of actors by creating a
competency ordering among them. Recent research
has suggested that the media may play an impor-
tant role in constructing such orderings by publi-
cizing and interpreting organizational performance
information (Deephouse, 2000; Johnson, Ellstrand,
Daily, & Dalton, 2005; Pollock & Rindova, 2003;
Rao, Greve, & Davis, 2001). Indeed, media-based
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interpretations are sometimes embedded in certifi-
cation contests through which actors are evaluated
relative to one another in such a way that strong
performers are identified and capture the endorse-
ments of reputable third parties (Rao, 1994; Scott,
1994). By a “certification contest,” we mean a com-
petition in which actors in a given domain are
ranked on the basis of performance criteria that key
stakeholders accept as credible and legitimate.
Such contests are common in many organizational
settings and have important effects upon an actor’s
reputation. Fortune, for instance, annually ranks
companies for public reputation, and U.S. News
and World Report publishes a highly influential
ranking of business schools.
Certification contests are useful measures of sta-
tus in organizational communities because they
combine many individual judgments on uniform
criteria, thus enabling summary comparisons
among rated actors (e.g., Fombrun, 1996; Rao,
1994). Fombrun (1996) suggested that stakeholders
prefer organizations to be publicly evaluated even
if the evaluative criteria are not completely com-
prehensive. The resulting rankings are important
because of the behavioral effects that they have on
organizations and their stakeholders (e.g., Elsbach
& Kramer, 1996). Indeed, it is particularly impor-
tant in uncertain environments for judgments to be
made on quality. It is in such environments that
certification contests are most likely to arise.
Prior research on certification has focused on the
link between organizational quality rankings and
organizational outcomes such as survival and per-
formance (Rao, 1994). In this article, we extend this
literature by examining the certification of individ-
ual managers and its effects on both organization-
and individual-level outcomes. In particular, we
examine the impact of a well-known certification
contest in the managerial realm that identifies star
CEOs. We first investigate whether firms can gain
value by employing a top executive whom expert
observers have anointed as a star performer. On the
one hand, there is good reason to believe that em-
ploying a star CEO could be valuable to a firm. As
Fombrun (1996) noted, having a highly recognized
CEO at the helm may reassure stakeholders that the
firm’s future prospects are bright and, in turn, en-
hance the firm’s ability to attract higher-quality
employees, increase its leverage over suppliers,
and gain better access to needed capital. On the
other hand, some arguments in the management
literature suggest that CEO star status has other
consequences for firms, such as managerial over-
confidence and hubris, that may have detrimental
effects on future performance. We investigate these
possibilities here.
We also investigate how being anointed as a star
influences important personal outcomes for the
CEO involved—specifically, his or her total
compensation. Frank and Cook (1995) suggested
that a “winner-take-all” compensation effect exists
among corporate executives, in that being certified
as a star CEO has important positive effects on
annual compensation over and above any actual
performance differences between stars and non-
stars. Moreover, research has also suggested a “Mat-
thew effect” (Merton, 1968) whereby high-status
actors receive greater rewards than other actors for
performing similar or even identical tasks
(Podolny, 1993; Rao, 1994).
At the same time, however, we also examine
whether there is a personal dark side to being rec-
ognized as a high-status actor. Fombrun (1996) sug-
gested that being publicly identified as a star car-
ries with it the “burden of celebrity.” If the CEO
certification process creates expectations that fu-
ture firm performance will be high, CEOs may suf-
fer negative outcomes if these expectations are not
met. This effect is theoretically important because
there is a good deal of evidence that CEO pay and
corporate performance are only loosely coupled
(e.g., Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia,
1989). CEO certification contests may be one social
mechanism that has evolved to “recouple” CEO pay
and performance.
To explore these issues, we used the results from
a widely publicized annual contest conducted by
the magazine Financial World from 1975 through
1996 that identified exemplary CEOs by surveying
over 1,000 peer CEOs and business analysts each
year. The contest provided a visible and public
assessment of the general esteem accorded to cor-
porate leaders by experts who served on their
boards, competed against them daily, and bought
and sold their companies’ stock. CEOs were rated
on a variety of financial and nonfinancial criteria
and then ranked on the basis of these ratings. The
magazine then awarded selected CEOs bronze, sil-
ver, or gold medals, according to their rankings.1
The results of the contest were publicized in Finan-
cial World’s March issue each year, and a dinner
was organized in New York City annually to honor
the medal winners.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
The uncertainty surrounding top managers’ im-
pact on the performance of firms has stimulated a
1 In each year, 1 gold, 10–12 silver, and about 175
bronze medals were awarded. See a more detailed ac-
count of the process in our methods section.
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good deal of scholarly interest in the symbolic as-
pects of senior leadership (e.g., Pfeffer, 1981) under
the assumption that the actions of CEOs are embed-
ded within a socially constructed system of inter-
pretations and opinions (e.g., Hayward, Rindova, &
Pollock, 2004; Khurana, 2002). Some research has
approached this topic from the perspective of man-
agers constructing self-attributions for corporate
performance (e.g., Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Salancik
& Meindl, 1984) and has shown that managers tend
to externalize failure and to internalize success.
Other research has focused on the interpretations of
external actors such as the business press (e.g.,
Chen & Meindl, 1991; Hayward et al., 2004;
Meindl, Erlich, & Dukerich, 1985) and corporate
boards (e.g., Khurana, 2002; Wade, Porac, & Pol-
lock, 1997) and has demonstrated that these inter-
pretations are similarly subject to a number of cog-
nitive and political influences. These influences
aside, however, the impact of top managers on firm
performance must be assessed for very practical
reasons and must be factored into any number of
personnel decisions, not the least of which is how
to compensate top managers for their contributions
to their firms. Researchers studying the symbolic
aspects of senior leadership have largely over-
looked these pragmatic issues, an oversight that
raises questions about the extent to which person-
nel decisions are independent of the contributions
of management or are linked in predictable ways to
management quality.
Organizational researchers have argued that,
under conditions of evaluative uncertainty, one
mechanism by which the capabilities of social
actors are assessed is certification contests and
endorsements from reputable third parties (Rao,
1994; Scott, 1994). Wiley and Zald (1968) argued,
for instance, that public accreditation enhances
organizational survival and access to resources.
Similarly, Wilson (1985) suggested that a firm
could lower its cost of capital by having reputa-
ble auditors certify its financial statements.
Singh, Tucker, and House (1986) found that vol-
untary social service organizations that received
a registration number and were listed in the Com-
munity Directory of Metropolitan Toronto en-
joyed greater legitimacy and were less likely to
fail. And studying the early auto industry, Rao
(1994) found that organizations whose automo-
biles won speed and reliability contests had im-
proved chances of survival. In all of these con-
texts, being certified in an uncertain environment
served as a signal that an actor was of high qual-
ity and likely to survive in the long run.
CEO Certifications and Firm Performance
Certification contests that identify high-perform-
ing CEOs may play a similar role in the corporate
governance arena. Research on governance has
shown that financial markets do attend to who
occupies the executive positions in public corpora-
tions (e.g., Worrell, Davidson, & Glascock, 1993).
Thus, employing a publicly certified CEO might be
expected to yield tangible performance benefits to a
firm by signaling that the CEO is of high quality and
likely to add economic value to the company. In
this vein, Deephouse argued that “reputation facil-
itates value creation by signaling to current and
potential exchange partners, including employees,
suppliers, investors, and customers” (2000: 1098).
Winning a certification contest may enhance a
CEO’s reputation and thus increase his or her firm’s
credibility in the eyes of key stakeholders (Fom-
brun, 1996; Hall, 1992). This credibility in turn
could, among other things, make stock offerings
more desirable or attract higher-quality employees.
Employing a certified CEO may also allow a firm to
enjoy cost savings. First, the status associated with
positive certifications may lower a firm’s cost of
capital. Fombrun and Shanley (1990) showed that
the terms for acquiring capital were more favorable
for higher-status firms. Second, to the extent that
certification positively influences the perception of
a firm’s future prospects, it may lower suppliers’
perceptions of the risk in transacting with the firm.
For example, Podolny (1993) suggested that the
status of underwriters affects the due diligence
costs of investment banks. The cost savings for
transacting parties in this instance make the high-
status partner more attractive.
A CEO may also be able to translate the credibil-
ity of being anointed a star into power when deal-
ing with internal and external constituencies. Spe-
cifically, being certified as a star CEO may increase
a CEO’s prestige power. As Finkelstein wrote,
“Prestige power is related to a manager’s ability to
absorb uncertainty from the institutional environ-
ment” (1992: 515). One way in which managers can
influence their prestige power is through building a
positive reputation among stakeholders (Dalton,
Barnes, & Zaleznik, 1968). As certification is
awarded by expert stakeholders, it would seem to
confer a positive institutional reputation and lead
to increased prestige power for the anointed star.
Similarly, Hayward and colleagues (2004) pro-
posed that star CEOs and key stakeholders em-
brace, rather than reject, a CEO’s celebrity status
and view it as a valuable intangible asset for a firm.
Hayward et al. posited that, as a result, such CEOs
will enjoy wider discretion and assert even greater
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control over their firms as these awards reinforce
both the efficacy of the star CEOs and the notion
that they enhance their firms’ performance. Given
that strategic decisions are unstructured and re-
plete with ambiguities (Mintzberg, Raisinghani, &
Theˆore´t, 1976) and therefore invite the use of
power, the influence that star CEOs gain from pub-
lic recognition may allow them to leverage their
knowledge and skills more effectively to yield pos-
itive firm outcomes. The effects of CEO certifica-
tion on both stakeholder perceptions and CEO job
performance lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a. CEO certifications are posi-
tively associated with a firm’s future
performance.
In contrast, some evidence from the organiza-
tions and behavioral finance literatures also sug-
gests the possibility that CEO certification is detri-
mental to future firm performance by inducing
overconfidence and hubris in CEOs anointed as
stars (e.g., Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Malmendier
& Tate, 2005). This research has suggested that
CEOs who have been successful in the past often
become overly confident in their abilities and ac-
tions, leading them to overestimate the expected
returns from their corporate investment decisions.
Defining hubris as “exaggerated pride or self-confi-
dence” (1997: 106), Hayward and Hambrick found
that CEO hubris, as measured by recent media
praise, led to both the payment of higher premiums
for corporate acquisitions and higher shareholder
losses from these acquisitions. The authors argued
that CEOs’ overconfidence in their acquisitions was
a direct outcome of the media praise these celebrity
CEOs received. Malmendier and Tate (2005) re-
ported evidence suggesting that overly confident
CEOs were more likely to invest in “pet projects”
funded by internal cash flows. If being certified as
a star CEO makes it more likely that an executive
will become overly confident of his or her deci-
sions and actions, certification may lead in some
cases to overly risky and ill-advised choices. These
arguments thus suggest the following alternative
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1b. CEO certifications are nega-
tively associated with a firm’s future
performance.
In investigating the effects of CEO certification
on firm performance, we examined market returns
and accounting returns in the years following
awards. Although prior research did not provide
much basis for distinguishing the effects of certifi-
cation on these different performance metrics ex
ante, it did seem reasonable to expect that CEO
certification might have different effects on market
returns and on profitability. Although we do not
advance specific predictions about these relation-
ships, we did investigate them as part of our
analysis.
CEO Certifications and CEO Compensation
According to Crystal (1991), many corporate
boards believe that high pay for star CEOs is a wise
investment in managerial talent. It is this belief that
underlies statements such as the one made by cor-
porate investor Warren Buffett: “You’ll never pay a
really top-notch executive . . . as much as they are
worth. A million, $3 million, or $10 million, it’s
still peanuts” (Forbes, 1990: 210).
Crystal described this ideology well in the
following:
A perennial debate in history circles centers on
whether great men, like Napoleon, really can change
the course of history, or, alternatively, whether his-
tory unfolds in a mysterious process that is only
marginally influenced by the Napoleons of this
world. Ask your typical board of directors to jump
into the debate among historians, and to a man . . .
they will vote with the “great man” camp. To them,
it is self evident that if you put the right person in
the CEO’s job and make sure he stays in the job,
great results will ensue. And to make sure he stays
in the job, pay him anything he requires, short of the
entire sales volume of the company. (1991: 159)
The insight behind Crystal’s observation is that,
regardless of whether CEOs’ marginal contributions
to firms justify their salaries, boards of directors
often believe that CEOs do great things that warrant
high pay, and this perception rules the compensa-
tion-setting process.
However, for the many reasons noted above, a
CEO’s marginal contribution to firm performance is
difficult to assess, and thus powerful shareholders,
the business press, and the public at large can con-
test board beliefs about this contribution. It is be-
cause these beliefs are contestable that CEO certifi-
cations act as useful cues about the competence of
managers. Indeed, stakeholders may heavily weight
the outcomes of certification contests when evalu-
ating a CEO’s talent because such contests are
likely to be perceived as one of the few relatively
neutral sources of information about a CEO’s con-
tribution. This view is consistent with Khurana’s
(2002) argument that stakeholders overweight ex-
ternal cues of a CEO’s reputation in their evalua-
tions of his or her talent, as well as with Frank and
Cook’s (1995) suggestion that performers who are
publicly recognized as stars collect compensation
premiums that are higher than their marginal con-
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tributions would justify. These arguments are also
consistent with the Matthew effect (Merton, 1968),
in that high-status actors receive higher rewards for
performing similar or identical tasks. Certified
CEOs may be able to leverage their high status in
negotiating future compensation contracts with
boards, or board members may simply feel justified
in paying star CEOs higher compensation as a re-
sult of reduced uncertainty about the quality of the
CEOs. The fact that the media sponsors CEO certi-
fication contests may be important in this regard.
Hayward and colleagues (2004) suggested that jour-
nalists often overattributed firm outcomes to the
actions of the CEO and played a crucial role in
creating CEO celebrity. Flattering media accounts
about medal-winning CEOs may encourage boards
to believe in the distinctive ability of winners and
thus grant higher compensation to managers certi-
fied in the press. Following these arguments, we
therefore hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2. CEO certifications are positively
associated with CEO compensation.
Although Hypothesis 2 predicts that winning a
medal will have a positive main effect on a CEO’s
compensation, his or her compensation may also
depend on the firm’s subsequent performance.
Meindl and colleagues (1985) found that poor firm
performance was often attributed to shoddy leader-
ship, while exemplary performance was often cred-
ited to the diligence and wisdom of CEOs, regard-
less of whether they were closely linked to these
performance outcomes. In addition, Hayward and
colleagues (2004) proposed that celebrity CEOs ac-
tively embraced and cultivated their celebrity by
taking credit for their success and attempting to
capture greater control of their firms. By embracing
their celebrity star CEOs may, in effect, publicly
reinforce the perceived cause-and-effect relation-
ship between their actions and firm performance.
Combined, these ideas suggest that a CEO’s win-
ning a certification contest makes it more likely
that observers will attribute the CEO’s firm’s out-
standing prior performance to CEO actions rather
than to external causes, and that the CEO will at-
tempt to exert greater control on the firm. If firm
performance is high after a CEO has been publicly
recognized as exemplary, these earlier attributions
will be reinforced. Thus, CEOs of firms that are
performing well who have been certified in previ-
ous years may obtain compensation premiums be-
cause their boards of directors are likely to attribute
the firms’ continuing favorable outcomes to the
CEOs’ wisdom and competence.
At the same time, these attributional tendencies
may make it quite difficult for a certified CEO to
construct credible accounts that deflect blame onto
external sources when subsequent firm perfor-
mance is poor (Ginzel, Kramer, & Sutton, 1992).
Attempts by management to link later poor perfor-
mance to external causes are thus likely to be
viewed as less credible, especially if a star CEO has
embraced and cultivated his or her own celebrity
(Hayward et al., 2004). Consequently, when a firm’s
performance is poor, CEOs who have won certifi-
cation contests in the past may actually be held
more accountable and receive lower compensation
than noncertified CEOs whose firms achieve simi-
lar levels of performance. Being recognized as a star
CEO may thus be a double-edged sword and may
carry with it the “burden of celebrity” (Fombrun,
1996). This line of reasoning suggests the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Certifications in the past are pos-
itively associated with a CEO’s compensation
when a firm’s subsequent performance is high
and negatively associated with his or her com-
pensation when the firm’s subsequent perfor-
mance is poor.
DATA AND METHODS
Data
Our sample was selected from the companies
that were members of the Standard & Poor’s (S&P)
500 at the end of 1992. The original sample in-
cluded the 366 companies that had fiscal years
ending on December 31. We selected this date to
avoid any sampling problems that might arise from
differences in fiscal years, such as significant
changes in the market environment in the nonover-
lapping periods. Missing data reduced our sample
to 278 companies. T-tests revealed no significant
differences between our sample and the S&P 500 as
a whole on such dimensions as size, performance,
and industry representation. To test our hypothe-
ses, we gathered panel data for the five years start-
ing in 1992 and ending in 1996. We began our
sample in 1992 because it was during this year that
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sig-
nificantly increased its reporting requirements
with regard to CEO pay policies. Firms were sys-
tematically required to report all elements of a
CEO’s compensation. Starting the sample in 1992
made it possible to collect total compensation data
for each CEO and ensured that the firms faced a
common regulatory environment over the period.
In cases in which there was a CEO succession dur-
ing the year, we kept the CEO who was replacing
the departing CEO in our sample, unless he or she
was appointed CEO after October of the year. We
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also omitted from our sample firm-years in which
the CEO had not been at the focal firm in some
capacity for the full year. As we report below, we
performed a variety of sensitivity analyses to en-
sure that our selection criteria did not affect the
results.
Dependent Variables
Firm performance. We assessed both the imme-
diate and longer-term effects of CEO certification
on performance. To measure the immediate reac-
tion of the stock market, we examined the impact of
its CEO’s winning a medal on a firm’s excess re-
turns in the days immediately following the an-
nouncement of the medal. For longer-term perfor-
mance, we used both an accounting and a market
measure to assess annual performance from 1992
through 1996. To measure compounded market re-
turns as the total yearly stock return of the com-
pany, with reinvestment of dividends assumed, we
used the formula (priceend – pricebeginning  divi-
dends)/pricebeginning. We also obtained annual re-
turn on common equity (ROE), which is a measure
of howwell a company is using the equity provided
by stockholders (Teitelman, 1996) and is com-
monly used as a basis for awarding incentive pay.
Both performance measures were obtained from the
COMPUSTAT database.
CEO compensation. We gathered data on com-
pensation from the EXECOMP database. Because
CEO compensation takes a wide variety of forms
(Bebchuk & Fried, 2004), we used CEOs’ total direct
compensation as our measure. A CEO’s total direct
compensation included salary, bonus, the value of
restricted stock grants, options granted during the
year (valued by the Black-Scholes method),2 long-
term incentive payouts that year, and all other
types of cash compensation paid in that year. As in
other studies, this variable was transformed into its
natural logarithm so that extreme values would not
unduly bias the analysis.
Independent Variables
CEO certification. We assessed CEO certifica-
tion using the results of Financial World’s annual
CEO of the Year competition. Financial World be-
gan this widely publicized annual contest in 1975
and continued it until 1996. Each year the maga-
zine surveyed a large group of business analysts
and CEOs who rated CEOs on four criteria, which it
described as follows:
(i) During the preceding year, this corporate chief
so managed his company’s affairs that it was
among the leaders in standard analytic mea-
surement tools of performance. Given the lim-
itation of the economy in general and his in-
dustry in particular, his company was able to
effect a high rate of return on investment capi-
tal, a big increase in net income, best manage-
ment of debt, etc.
(ii) The executive so managed his company that it
increased its position in the field significantly
or maintained its position in spite of general
adversity.
(iii) This chief executive has assembled an effective
working team to surround him so that corporate
affairs are run smoothly with creativity, inno-
vation and dynamism. Morale in his company
is high in response to his leadership.
(iv) This chief executive has not only been respon-
sible for input into his company but has con-
tributed significantly to his industry and/or
community and the nation at large. (Financial
World, 1975: 16)
All CEOs of companies with more than $100
million in assets or sales were eligible for the
award, and between 2,000 and 3,000 CEOs were
considered in a given year. In each industry, ana-
lysts and CEOs selected three bronze medal award
winners on the basis of the above criteria. The
bronze medalists in each industry were then
grouped into general business categories and 10–12
silver medalists as well as 1 gold medalist were
selected from among the bronze medalists across
all categories.
The fact that three types of medals were awarded
raised the issue of how we should code this vari-
able. It was not meaningful to distinguish between
different types of medals because there was only
one gold medal winner each year and a relatively
small number of silver medals. Also, because ana-
lysts and CEOs first decided which contestants
would win a medal (of any type), we felt that the
most reasonable approach was to measure whether
or not each CEO in our sample won any medal
during the period of our study. We used this infor-
mation to construct two variables.
2 Although we recognized that the valuation of stock
options can be problematic, previous research has shown
that various option-pricing methods produce results that
are very highly correlated (r  .90; Sanders, Davis-Blake,
& Fredrickson, 1995). This high correlation, combined
with the fact that the Black-Scholes method is the most
widely used means of valuing stock options (Gerhart &
Rynes, 2003), led us to use this valuation methodology in
the absence of a significantly better one.
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Medal in current year. This was a dummy vari-
able that measured whether a firm’s CEO won any
medal in March of each year, and we used it to
assess whether certification had a positive impact
on firm performance (Hypotheses 1a and 1b) and
the immediate effect of winning a medal early in
the year on that year’s total compensation to the
CEO (Hypothesis 2).3
Medals won in previous five years. This vari-
able, which captured the number of medals a CEO
had won over the previous five years, reflected our
reasoning that the effects of certification on com-
pensation were likely to extend beyond one year
(Hypothesis 2). It was also likely that winning mul-
tiple medals would increase the impact of certifi-
cations on compensation. We interacted this vari-
able with performance (measured as both ROE and
stock return) to test Hypothesis 3.
Control Variables
Company size. This variable was defined as the
logarithm of a company’s total assets and was based
on data obtained from the COMPUSTAT database.
Institutional ownership. We defined this vari-
able as the percentage of outstanding stock held by
institutional investors, as identified in the First
Call database.
Industry return. We defined a firm’s industry as
all companies that had the same two-digit SIC code.
Although SIC codes can range from one to seven
digits, past research has found that the two-digit
level captures most of the systematic industry vari-
ation in stock prices (Alford, 1992; Clarke, 1989).
Moreover, past research suggests that corporate
boards make performance comparisons at the two-
digit level (e.g., Antle & Smith, 1986; Gibbons &
Murphy, 1990; Porac, Wade, & Pollock, 1999). A
company’s total assets for a given year were used to
weight that year’s performance.4 We calculated in-
dustry performance each year using the formula ij
(total assetsij  total returnij)/(ij total assetsij),
where i indicated each company in industry j for a
given year. These data were obtained from
COMPUSTAT.
CEO tenure. How long a CEO has been on the job
obviously will influence whether observers at-
tribute a firm’s past performance to that CEO’s abil-
ity. To control for these effects, we calculated CEO
tenure as the number of years a CEO had been in his
or her present position. These data were obtained
from firm proxy statements,Who’s Who in Finance
and Industry, and the Forbes annual survey of ex-
ecutive compensation.
Outside CEO. When CEOs are appointed from
outside a firm, they may be more visible and may
also receive higher compensation than internally
promoted CEOs. To control for these effects, we
coded an outsider dummy variable 1 if the differ-
ence between a CEO’s organizational tenure and
positional tenure was less than or equal to three
years. We chose the three-year difference because
an outside successor is frequently brought into a
company at a rank below that of CEO and groomed
for one or more years before becoming CEO (Can-
nella & Lubatkin, 1993). This process allows the
new CEO to become familiar with all aspects of the
company and allows the board and departing CEO
to evaluate the new CEO’s potential prior to his/her
appointment.
New CEO. If an individual is promoted from a
lower position to CEO during the course of a year,
his or her pay will be prorated on the basis of the
amount of time spent in each position during that
year. Thus, CEOs appointed in a current year have
lower levels of compensation because they spent
part of the year in a lower position. To control for
the effects of midyear promotions on compensa-
tion, we created a dummy control variable, coding
it 1 if promotion to CEO had occurred sometime
during the current year. We also reran our analyses
excluding such new CEOs, and the results did not
change substantively.
Year dummies. Dummy variables for the years
1993–96 were also included in the models as con-
trols for any period effects in our time series. For
instance, year dummies controlled for changes in
general economic conditions from year to year.
Methods
Event study. To measure the immediate perfor-
mance effects of winning a medal, we performed an
event study. Finance researchers have used event
studies frequently since the early 80s (MacKinlay,
1997), and management researchers have more re-
cently employed them (e.g., Arthur & Cook, 2004;
Johnson et al., 2005; Sanders & Boivie, 2004). If
investors believe that winning a medal conveys
3 Because winning a medal was in part determined by
prior financial performance, it is possible that medal
winners were primarily benefiting from a financial
“halo” (Brown & Perry, 1994). In analyses not reported
here, we used Brown and Perry’s halo removal method-
ology on both our medal measures and reran our analy-
ses. The results were substantively unchanged. For ease
of interpretation, we report results here using the unmod-
ified measures.
4 We also calculated a measure using a company’s total
assets for the previous year; the results of our analysis
were substantively unchanged.
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new information about the quality of a CEO and
his/her ability to positively influence the future
cash flows of a firm, one would expect a positive
stock market reaction in the days following the
announcement of an award. In event studies, one
must first identify the timing of the event of inter-
est. Using either a financial market model or a
market index, researchers then calculate expected
returns for each firm. Each firm’s expected return is
then subtracted from its actual return. These differ-
ences are known as excess (unexpected or unantic-
ipated) returns and reflect the extent to which the
event provided new information about the value of
the firm (Brown & Warner, 1985). Finally, research-
ers use statistical tests to determine whether these
excess returns are significantly different from 0
over a specified time window.
We used two approaches to calculate the ex-
pected returns provided by the EVENTUS program
available on the Wharton Research Data Services
Web site. In the first method, we used the market
model, in which regression analysis relates a firm’s
return to that of a market portfolio (in this case, the
S&P 500 index). Using daily returns, we estimated
a regression equation over the estimation period
(ending 46 days before the event and extending
back to 255 days prior to the event) to predict each
firm’s returns.5 Estimation periods generally end
before the event of interest so that the returns at the
time of the event will not influence the model
parameters. We then used the resulting regression
coefficients and a firm’s actual daily returns to
compute abnormal returns for each firm over each
day of the event period. The second common ap-
proach in event studies is to calculate a market-
adjusted return by subtracting the return of the
market during each day of the event period from
the firm’s daily returns. We used the resulting ex-
cess returns (ERit) provided by each method to cal-
culate the average daily excess returns (AERt) by
summing the average excess returns over the event
window. Following previous event study research,
we then used the t-statistic to assess whether these
excess returns were significantly different from 0
(Brown & Warner, 1985; MacKinlay, 1997).
In event studies, determining the exact timing of
the event of interest is critical since new informa-
tion is likely to be quickly incorporated into firm
security prices. We first considered using the pub-
lication date of the issue of Financial Times an-
nouncing each year’s awards as the indicator of
when information about the awards became public.
However, magazines are often available prior to
their publication dates, and the results of such a
contest are likely to be made public early as a
means of generating increased interest in the mag-
azine. Thus, we performed a search on Lexis-Nexus
using a variety of relevant search terms and re-
corded the earliest dates at which the contest re-
sults for each year were mentioned. In all cases,
these occurred prior to the publication date of the
magazine. Since these announcements were often
press releases put out by the companies them-
selves, we believed that our event dates were accu-
rate and reflected when the award information was
actually released. In our analyses, we focused on
one-, two-, and three-day event windows. One dis-
advantage of using longer windows is that other,
unrelated events may be confounded with the
event of interest (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).6 We
will, however, report the results of supplementary
analyses using longer windows.
Yearly performance and compensation. Be-
cause our data extended over five years and we had
multiple observations for each firm, our observa-
tions were not independent and so not appropriate
for analysis with a simple ordinary least squares
regression. We considered using a random-effects
model, but use of such a model requires that coef-
ficients obtained from the random-effects model
must equal those from a fixed-effects model. If this
is not the case, it means that the random-effects
estimator will produce biased results because there
is a correlation between the independent variables
and the unit effects that has not been controlled for.
Using a test developed by Hausman (1978), we
found that this assumption was violated. Hence,
the fixed-effects estimator was used.
Estimating a fixed-effects model is equivalent to
adding a dummy variable for each firm (Greene,
1993). A fixed-effects model controls for constant
unmeasured differences across firms that may ex-
plain differences in the dependent variables. For
instance, because some firms pay very well for all
positions, while other firms pay less for compara-
ble positions, firm dummies are important because
they control for effects of such wage differences.
Fixed-effects models are considered conservative
5 Typically event studies employ an estimation period
of either 255 or 360 days prior to an event. We tested an
alternative model that employed the 360-day estimation
period, and our results were substantively unchanged.
6 Even in our three-day window, 19 observations had
confounding events, such as earnings announcements
and new-product introductions. However, excluding
these observations did not substantively change the re-
sults of any of our event study analyses, so we retained
all observations for the analyses reported here.
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because only changes in independent variables
within a firm can produce significant effects. Thus,
a positive coefficient in these models can be inter-
preted as signifying that a positive change in an
independent variable within a firm will cause a
positive change in the dependent variable within
that firm. As we will discuss below in our results
section, we also employed several other time series
methodologies to check the robustness of the find-
ings from our fixed-effects models.
Industry dummies were not included in the time
series models because firm effects controlled for
variance due to industry membership, as industry
membership was constant for all the firms during
the study period. In all of our analyses, we ex-
cluded CEOs who had joined their firms in a cur-
rent year since they could not be held responsible
for the prior year’s performance. Unless otherwise
noted, all of our independent variables were lagged
one year behind our dependent measures. For ex-
ample, in our models we used performance in 1991
to predict 1992 total compensation.
RESULTS
The list of medal-winning CEOs in our sample
contains many of the best-known and most re-
spected CEOs in the United States (e.g., Jack Welch,
Lawrence Bossidy, and Stanley Gault). The entire
list of medal winners is available from the authors.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for each of
the variables that we measured as well as their
bivariate correlations.
Firm Performance
Tables 2a and 2b present the results of our event
study and show the excess returns associated with
winning a medal. Table 2a shows the results of
examining cumulative excess returns in the three
days prior to the announcement of the awards (days
3 to 1). These returns are not significant, sug-
gesting that the information did not leak out to the
market before the announcement date. Although
they are not shown here, we also calculated event
windows that extended 6 days, two weeks, and 30
days prior to the event and found no significant
effects. During the event windows subsequent to
the announcement, however, we do find evidence
of a positive stock market reaction. The cumulative
excess returns calculated using both the market
model and market-adjusted returns are positive and
significant for the intervals from 0 to 2 days and 0
to 3 days. The cumulative excess returns for the
period between the day of the event and one day
after (0, 1) are positive and marginally significant
when the market model is used and highly signifi-
cant when cumulative market-adjusted excess re-
turns are used. We also calculated binomial Z-sta-
tistics, to test “whether the proportion of positive to
negative returns exceeds the number expected from
the market model” (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997:
635). This test also indicated statistically signifi-
cant, positive abnormal returns in the days follow-
ing certification.
To investigate these effects further, we examined
the daily excess returns from three days before to
three days after each event. Table 2b shows that the
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
1. Medal winner this year 0.14 0.35
2. Medals won in past 5 years 0.57 1.08 .34
3. CEO total direct
compensationa
7.83 0.81 .20 .23
4. Return on equity 9.19 48.22 .05 .05 .10
5. Company return 20.53 36.00 .08 .05 .16 .02
6. Total assetsa 8.76 1.44 .16 .23 .44 .06 .03
7. Industry return 15.51 16.11 .05 .04 .08 .02 .42 .05
8. Outside CEO 0.22 0.41 .04 .02 .10 .05 .08 .04 .03
9. CEO tenure 6.47 6.65 .06 .30 .02 .02 .01 .04 .03 .00
10. CEO tenure squared 86.05 180.98 .04 .21 .02 .03 .02 .06 .03 .06 .93
11. Institutional ownership 0.55 0.15 .03 .04 .17 .01 .13 .05 .09 .02 .01 .05
12. New CEO 0.09 0.28 .12 .15 .05 .01 .00 .00 .02 .04 .30 .15 .01
13. 1993 0.20 0.40 .02 .03 .12 .00 .04 .02 .13 .02 .03 .01 .05 .01
14. 1994 0.20 0.40 .02 .01 .04 .02 .08 .01 .11 .01 .02 .03 .12 .03 .26
15. 1995 0.20 0.40 .03 .00 .09 .06 .30 .03 .41 .02 .03 .02 .02 .03 .25 .25
16. 1996 0.20 0.40 .03 .05 .20 .00 .19 .05 .20 .03 .04 .03 .10 .03 .25 .24 .24
a Logarithm.
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excess returns are positive and significant one day
after an event using both the market model and
market-adjusted returns. Further, the results we ob-
tained using both approaches are quite similar in
that the returns one day after the event are .25
percent with the market model and .26 percent
with market-adjusted excess returns. Two days af-
ter the event, only the excess returns calculated
with market-adjusted returns are significant, al-
though the excess returns calculated with the mar-
ket model are positive and close to significance.
Overall, our results suggest that market investors
view these awards favorably. In general, the stron-
gest effect occurs one day after an announcement
and fades thereafter as the information is integrated
into investors’ evaluations of firms.7
To investigate the longer-term effects of certifica-
tion, we ran additional event studies over a longer
window. Table 2c shows the cumulative excess
returns associated with winning a medal calculated
with a window extending from the third day after
certification to 30 days, 90 days, 180 days, and 240
days later. Using the market model, we found in the
30-day window that the cumulative excess return
becomes negative (1.13%) and marginally signif-
icant. This negative return increases to 8.23 per-
cent by day 240 and is highly significant. Com-
bined, these results suggest that although the
immediate effect of winning a medal is positive,
over time this trend reverses and becomes negative.
In contrast, however, the market-adjusted model
shows no negative long-term effects. The excess
returns, although not significant, are positive.
Differences in how excess returns are calculated
with each approach may in part account for the
variation in results. Recall that in the market
model, one determines a firm’s sensitivity to the
return of the market by regressing market returns
on the firm’s actual returns during a period prior to
the event window. Excess returns are then calcu-
lated by subtracting this expected return from the
firm’s actual returns during the event window. Es-
7 One possible source of bias in our method is that our
events were clustered on specific event dates (such as the
days the awards were announced each year). Although
Brown and Warner (1985) provided evidence that such
clustering generally does not affect results from daily
data, we reestimated our excess returns over these event
windows using the grouping option in Eventus, which
clusters the returns, and our short-term returns did not
change.
TABLE 2
Excess Market Returns Surrounding the Announcement of Medalsa
Days
Market Model Market-Adjusted Model
Abnormal Return t Abnormal Return t
(2a) Cumulative excess returns
3 to 1 0.17% 0.84 0.04% 0.18
0 to 1 0.28 1.66† 0.38 2.28*
0 to 2 0.47 2.30* 0.64 3.08**
0 to 3 0.49 2.06* 0.69 2.90**
(2b) Daily excess returns
3 0.04 0.38 0.01 0.09
2 0.01 0.07 0.05 0.44
1 0.12 1.01 0.08 0.66
0 0.03 0.28 0.13 1.07
1 0.25 2.06* 0.26 2.16*
2 0.20 1.65† 0.25 2.12*
3 0.02 0.13 0.06 0.46
(2c) Long-term excess returns
3 to 30 1.13 1.79† 0.14 0.22
3 to 90 3.36 3.01** 0.70 0.63
3 to 180 7.07 4.45** 0.88 0.55
3 to 240 8.23 4.48** 2.38 1.29
aMedals were Financial Times awards to CEOs. n  186. The number of medals in the event study did not equal the number in the
sample because the event study programwe used (EVENTUS) did not have stock performance history for every company. Thus, our sample
of medal winners was reduced from 195 to 186.
† p  .10
* p  .05
** p  .01
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sentially, this procedure means that market model
excess returns are adjusted according to a firm’s
past market response and its risk profile. In the
market-adjusted-return model, a firm’s prior sensi-
tivity to the market is not taken into account. Ex-
cess returns are calculated by simply subtracting
the average return from the S&P 500 over the event
period from a firm’s actual returns. Unlike the mar-
ket model, the market-adjusted model uses the
same expected return (that of the S&P 500) for all
firms. Our long-term results may suggest that al-
though the firms in our sample were not doing
worse than the average S&P 500 firm, they were
doing worse than they had done historically.
As we noted earlier, the results from using longer
event windows are only suggestive both because of
the distributional assumptions required and the
fact that other events are likely to influence perfor-
mance during a longer event window. Table 3 pre-
sents fixed-effect models used to examine whether
CEO certifications are associated with lower or
higher firm performance in the subsequent year to
test Hypothesis 1. In some sense, the fixed-effects
model is similar to the market model because it
measures within-firm variation. The market model
compares current performance to what would be
expected given a firm’s past sensitivity to the mar-
ket, and the fixed-effects model examines how win-
ning a medal changes performance within a firm. In
this instance, even if a firm performed better on
average than other firms over the time period, if its
within-firm performance declined one could view
the effect of the medal as negative. Model 1 pre-
sents our control model predicting yearly market
returns. In model 2, we added whether a CEO won
a medal at the beginning of a current year and the
number of medals won over the previous five years.
We found no support for Hypothesis 1a in that
winning a medal was not positively associated with
future market performance, but we did find some
support for Hypothesis 1b in that winning a medal
was negatively associated with a firm’s market re-
turn. In fact, model 2 shows that a firm whose CEO
received a medal at the beginning of a year had
lower market performance during that same year.
Using an F-test, we also found a significant increase
in explained variance (R2) between our best-fitting
model 2 and our base model 1.
TABLE 3
Results of Fixed-Effects Regression Analysis for Performancea
Variable
Market Return Return on Equity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3b Model 4 Model 5
ROE 0.42** (0.05) 0.41** (0.05) 0.45** (0.11)
Market return 0.06** (0.02) 0.06** (0.02)
Total assets, lagged 4.87 (4.28) 5.06 (4.26) 3.19 (6.18) 6.30* (3.52) 6.31* (3.53)
Industry return 0.44** (0.07) 0.44** (0.07) 0.39** (0.12) 0.04 (0.05) 0.04 (0.05)
CEO tenure 0.12 (0.24) 0.13 (0.25) 0.19 (0.30) 0.17 (0.20) 0.17 (0.20)
Institutional ownership 89.25** (15.07) 88.64** (15.02) 160.87** (54.45) 0.89 (12.71) 0.88 (12.71)
Outside CEO 11.73** (3.95) 12.20** (3.93) 0.38 (6.19) 1.72 (3.23) 1.70 (3.23)
New CEO 2.01 (3.17) 0.57 (3.20) 1.10 (3.44) 4.30* (2.60) 4.35* (2.63)
1993 0.85 (2.33) 1.20 (2.33) 10.23** (3.30) 1.66 (1.98) 1.65 (1.98)
1994 13.23** (2.27) 13.68** (2.36) 5.04** (1.96) 5.03** (1.97)
1995 19.04** (2.57) 18.46** (2.57) 44.49** (5.45) 6.04** (2.29) 6.03** (2.29)
1996 9.45** (2.69) 8.79** (2.69) 36.13** (6.00) 5.86** (2.20) 5.84** (2.21)
Medal winner this year 8.33** (2.64) 11.18** (2.86) 0.26 (2.16)
Medals won in last five years 0.21 (1.45) 0.14 (1.58) 0.03 (1.19)
Market return, lagged 0.16** (0.05)
Constant 101.37** (38.03) 104.37** (37.88) 5.89** (1.16) 64.95* (31.21) 65.03* (31.25)
Observations 1,271 1,271 955 1,268 1,268
R2 .46 .47 .48 .48
Adjusted R2 .31 .31 .33 .33
2 372.83
a Firm dummies are included but not shown.
b This model used the Arellano-Bond (1991) approach, in which a lagged dependent variable is used as an instrument. As a result, the
number of observations is smaller because the first year must be dropped. In addition, in a few cases in which lagged market returns were
unavailable, those observations had to be dropped.
* p  .05
** p  .01
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One possible problem with this model is that we
did not control for prior performance, which is
almost certain to be causally related to winning a
medal. Because high performers are also more
likely to be medal winners, the negative effect of
certification in model 2 may be due to regression to
the mean. To investigate this possibility further, we
estimated a dynamic model that included a lagged
dependent variable. However, including a lagged
dependent variable in a standard fixed-effects
equation is problematic because the error term will
almost certainly be correlated with the lagged en-
dogenous variable. To obtain consistent estimates,
we used the model developed by Arellano and
Bond (1991), which uses the generalized method of
moments (GMM). As can be seen in model 3, we
continued to find that winning a medal at the be-
ginning of a current year had a negative impact on
performance, once again offering support for Hy-
pothesis 1b. In models 4 and 5, we explored
whether winning a medal had an impact on ac-
counting performance but found no effects. In an
analysis not shown here, we used the Arellano-
Bond approach to estimate a model predicting ROE
with a lagged dependent variable, but the results
were the same. In sum, these results suggest that,
although the market has an initially positive reac-
tion to CEO certification, over the long term there is
a negative relationship between CEO certification
and market performance, and no relationship be-
tween CEO certification and accounting perfor-
mance in the following year. Therefore, results sup-
port Hypothesis 1a only in the case of short-term
excess returns. Hypothesis 1b receives partial sup-
port, in that winning a medal was negatively asso-
ciated with annual market returns and one measure
of longer-term excess returns, but it was unrelated
to future accounting performance.
CEO Compensation
Table 4 presents the results of analyses of the
TABLE 4
CEO Total Compensation
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5a
ROE 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
Market return 0.00** (0.00) 0.00** (0.00) 0.00** (0.00) 0.00* (0.00) 0.00** (0.00)
Total assets, lagged 0.09 (0.07) 0.09 (0.07) 0.11† (0.07) 0.10† (0.07) 0.202** (0.02)
Industry return 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00)
CEO tenure 0.03** (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.02* (0.01) 0.02* (0.01)
CEO tenure squared 0.00** (0.00) 0.00** (0.00) 0.00** (0.00) 0.00** (0.00) 0.00* (0.00)
Institutional ownership 0.46* (0.27) 0.47* (0.27) 0.47* (0.27) 0.45* (0.27) 0.65** (0.23)
Outside CEO 0.10† (0.07) 0.09† (0.07) 0.09 (0.07) 0.09† (0.07) 0.17* (0.08)
New CEO 0.05 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06) 0.06 (0.06) 0.10* (0.06)
1993 0.10* (0.04) 0.11** (0.04) 0.10** (0.04) 0.11** (0.04) 0.08* (0.04)
1994 0.37** (0.04) 0.38** (0.04) 0.37** (0.04) 0.38** (0.04) 0.35** (0.04)
1995 0.44** (0.05) 0.45** (0.05) 0.44** (0.05) 0.45** (0.05) 0.41** (0.05)
1996 0.57** (0.05) 0.59** (0.05) 0.57** (0.05) 0.59** (0.05) 0.53** (0.04)
Medal winner this year 0.10* (0.05) 0.10* (0.05) 0.10* (0.05) 0.10* (0.05)
Medals won in last five
years
0.05* (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) 0.04† (0.03) 0.04 (0.03)
Medals won in last five
years  ROE
0.00** (0.00) 0.00** (0.00)
Medals won in last five
years  market
return
0.00** (0.00)
Constant 6.33** (0.65) 6.31** (0.65) 6.19** (0.65) 6.30** (0.65) 5.24** (0.27)
Observations 1,267 1,267 1,267 1,267 1,173
R2 .78 .78 .78 .78
Adjusted R2 .71 .71 .72 .72
2 395.88
aWe estimated this model using generalized estimating equations first proposed by Liang and Zerger (1986) and implemented it using
the XTGEE command in STATA. Computing the correlation matrix to adjust for autocorrelation required that there be no gaps between
years within a firm. Thus, firms in which there were missing values between years were dropped.
† p  .10
* p  .05
** p  .01
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relationship between CEO certification and total
CEO compensation in the award year. Model 1
presents the effects of the controls, and model 2
adds the two medal-winning measures. Both of
these certification measures have positive and
highly significant effects, indicating strong support
for Hypothesis 2. Winning a medal increases a
CEO’s pay in that year by approximately 10 per-
cent, and each medal awarded in the previous five
years adds almost 5 percent to his/her total pay.
In model 3, we tested Hypothesis 3 by interacting
medals won in the past with firm performance as
measured by return on common equity. Although
the main effect of winning medals in the previous
five years is no longer significant, the interaction is
highly significant and in the expected positive di-
rection. This finding supports Hypothesis 3 for ac-
counting performance. The lack of a main effect for
certification means that winning medals has a pos-
itive effect on a CEO’s pay when accounting per-
formance is above zero but a negative effect when it
is less than zero. Because an ROE of zero is at the
11th percentile in our sample, this finding suggests
that it is quite easy for a CEO who has won one or
more medals in the previous five years to benefit
from a current year’s award. In model 4, we inves-
tigated whether Hypothesis 3 holds for market per-
formance. Although past medals had a weak, posi-
tive effect on total pay, the interaction with
subsequent market performance was not signifi-
cant. In an analysis not shown here, we entered the
interaction terms for both accounting and market
performance together in another model. Only the
interaction between winning medals in the past
five years and accounting performance was signif-
icant, suggesting that model 3 was our best-fitting
and most parsimonious model. It is also worth not-
ing that the effects of being a current medal winner
were robust and positive over all specifications.8
Using an F-test, we also found a significant increase
in explained variance between our best-fitting
model 3 and model 1.
Because panel pay data within a firm are often
correlated across years, it was possible that the
disturbances were correlated across periods and
that autocorrelation was affecting our results. More
specifically, if unobserved properties of a firm were
gradually changing across years, our fixed-effects
models would not capture these changes because
such models only control for variables that do not
change over years within a firm. To assess the robust-
ness of our findings, we reestimated our best-fitting
model 3 using a relatively new class of robust estima-
tors known as generalized estimating equations (GEE;
Liang & Zerger 1986). An advantage of this approach
is that it analyzes bothwithin- and between-firm vari-
ations, unlike the fixed-effects model, which only
examines changes within a firm.
In GEE models, one must choose a distribution
for the dependent variable, a link function to relate
the outcome to the dependent variables, and a spec-
ification of the “working” within-firm correlation
matrix. Using the XTGEE routine in STATA 8.0, we
chose a Gaussian (normal) distribution and an
identity link function that corresponded to a linear
model. For the correlation matrix, we assumed that
there was a first-order autoregressive disturbance
(AR1), in which disturbances from the prior period
for a firm are correlated with disturbances in the
current period. We calculated robust standard er-
rors using the Huber (1967) and White (1982) esti-
mator. Model 5 is model 3 reestimated with this
approach. As can be seen, all of our results are
robust to this specification.
We also performed additional sensitivity anal-
yses. Recall that our selection criterion for CEOs
was that they had been appointed to their posi-
tions by the end of October of a current year. In
addition, a focal CEO had to have been at his or
her firm in some capacity in the previous year. In
23 cases in which the focal CEO had started dur-
ing the current year, the prior CEO had won a
medal and subsequently left the firm. It is unclear
what the effect of such medals would be, since
these CEOs generally left their firms at the end of
the prior year or early in the current year. Con-
ceivably, the effects of such medals could even be
negative, since star CEOs had left the firms. We
found no separate effect of these medal winners
in our event analysis, and when we pooled them
with winners who did stay with their firms, our
results did not change. In our panel analyses of
performance and compensation, we also tried in-
cluding a dummy variable indicating that the
previous CEO of a firm had won a medal, but this
variable was not significant. Finally, we dropped
all new CEOs who had started in the current year
from our sample, as well as those that had been at
the firm less than six months during the previous
year; our results remained robust.
8 We also tried interacting winning a medal in a cur-
rent year with past performance; the interaction was not
significant. In supplementary analyses, we also inter-
acted winning medals in the past with winning a medal
in the current year. We found that this interaction had a
marginally significant (p  .10) negative effect, suggest-
ing that the impact of winning a new medal on compen-
sation is attenuated if a CEO has won in the past. All of
our results remained robust to this specification.
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DISCUSSION
Complementing previous research that has estab-
lished that certification contests can have powerful
effects on organizations by influencing organiza-
tion-level legitimacy and status (Rao, 1994), our
study examines the effects of certification on indi-
viduals in the corporate governance arena. We used
the annual results of Financial World’s CEO of the
Year competition as an indicator of the general
opinion about CEO abilities among analysts and
peers. We examined the influence of being certified
as a star CEO on both organizational performance
and CEO compensation. Our results suggest that, at
least initially, stockholders value such certification
of CEOs, as evidenced by the positive abnormal
stock returns that immediately followed the an-
nouncement of the awards. And yet these effects
quickly fade and appear to become negative over
the subsequent months. Regression analyses show-
ing that the relationship between medals and
yearly returns is negative even after prior returns
are controlled for reinforces our confidence in
these longer-term negative effects. Our results also
suggest that being certified does not seem to be
associated with either higher or lower one-year ac-
counting profits for award recipients’ firms.
At the same time, being certified had a positive
effect on the recipients’ compensation that went
over and above performance differences between
winners’ and nonwinners’ firms. If a CEO’s com-
pensation partially reflects the extent to which a
company’s directors value his or her abilities and
contributions, this result suggests that certification
does indeed heighten the tendency of a board to
attribute special competencies to the CEO. Our data
suggest that this attribution then leads the board to
set up an evaluative gauntlet for the CEO in subse-
quent years, as certification has a positive impact
on compensation as long as return on equity re-
mains positive. If a company achieves a negative
ROE, star CEOs then receive lower total compensa-
tion than CEOs who never won a medal for an
equivalent level of performance. This gauntlet is
not very severe, however. The performance inflec-
tion point is at the 11th percentile of performance
in our sample, suggesting that profitability need not
be very high for CEOs to capitalize on their celeb-
rity status.
This general pattern of results suggests a more
nuanced representation of the effects of CEO certi-
fication on firm and individual outcomes than our
original hypotheses and prior research suggest. One
obvious subtlety is the difference between profit-
ability and stock returns as measures of firm per-
formance. Our results indicate that profitability is
insensitive to CEO certification, suggesting that star
CEOs have neither a positive nor a negative effect
on the operating results of firms, at least over the
one-year time window that we used in our analy-
ses. Our five years of panel data did not allow us to
rigorously analyze multiyear lagged relationships
without losing large numbers of observations, so
our results are inconclusive regarding any longer-
term profitability effect.
However, the lack of one-year results is sugges-
tive and theoretically important, given the concom-
itant effects of certification on both immediate and
one-year market returns. If CEO certification has no
short-term effect on the profitability of a company,
then winning a medal can only be, at best, a noisy
signal regarding the relationship between manage-
rial ability and longer-term profitability. Yet our
results indicate that both investors and company
boards respond to this signal in predicatble ways,
both immediately and over the course of the year in
which an award is won. We observed effects simi-
lar to those observed by Sanders and Boivie (2004)
in their study of governance practices on IPO un-
derpricing: investors initially bid up the price of a
company’s stock after learning about a CEO medal.
However, shortly afterward they reversed course
and bid the price down. Over the course of the year,
firms with medal-winning CEOs thus had lower
cumulative market returns than firms with non–
medal winners at the helm. It is important to note
that this reversal cannot be explained by regression
to the mean from the previous year’s stock perfor-
mance, since we controlled for prior market returns
in our analyses. Company boards seem to respond
quickly to CEO certification as well, since our re-
sults show that winning a medal increases a CEO’s
total direct compensation for that year by about 10
percent. They also continue to respond to certifica-
tion over the course of the following year by paying
medal winners more than non–medal winners
when their firms continue to be profitable—but
paying them less when their firms are not
profitable.
One possible explanation for this more nuanced
pattern of data is that certification does indeed
create a burden of celebrity. Although sharehold-
ers’ and boards’ immediate response is positive,
certification may also heighten their expectations
about future performance. Our results suggest that
simply maintaining a certain level of performance
may not be sufficient for shareholders of firms with
celebrity CEOs. Firms that employ star CEOs seem
to have a higher “expectational hurdle” to meet in
order to be valued positively by the market. Boards
of directors seem to be more lenient in their expec-
tations, but they do respond more negatively to
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lower profitability when a star CEO is involved. In
the eyes of both investors and boards, then, star
CEOs may very well create the seeds of their own
devaluation because “the reputations they earn
from doing some things particularly well sit on the
slippery ground of their constituents’ fickle inter-
pretation” (Fombrun, 1996: 388).
We did not find that overconfident star CEOs
undermined short-term profitability, although the
negative stock returns that we observed could con-
ceivably imply that investors were anticipating
lower profitability in the future owing to executive
decisions that they perceived as risky. So we can-
not rule out CEO hubris as a possible influence on
our performance results. In addition, CEO hubris is
a plausible explanation for our results regarding the
relationship between subsequent firm profitability
and CEO compensation. We have suggested that
CEO certifications may encourage compensation
committees to attribute responsibility for company
outcomes to the CEOs. Thus, certified CEOs whose
companies perform well are rewarded handsomely,
while poor performers are penalized. Yet in many
cases a CEO’s compensation is partially dependent
on meeting performance targets that are set at the
beginning of the year in the course of discussions
between the board and the CEO. Because of the
generalized attribution, perhaps shared by the CEO,
that a star CEO can have a bottom-line impact on
future company performance, the formulas that de-
termine the amount of incentive compensation
awarded at the end of the year may be much more
sensitive to a firm’s subsequent performance than
the criteria used to evaluate lesser-known manag-
ers. By this reasoning, a board’s attribution that a
star CEO can influence the performance of their
firm plays out in a tighter performance-compensa-
tion link. Celebrated and visible CEOs with records
of accomplishment may very well agree to this
tighter link because they have confidence in their
own abilities to increase their firms’ future profit-
ability. Certification may essentially make both
board members and the CEO believe that the CEO’s
success is sustainable. If the firm’s subsequent per-
formance is poor, however, it will be more difficult
for an overconfident star CEO to modify previously
agreed-upon targets and to change the “rules of the
game.”
These expectational effects on star CEO compen-
sation have interesting implications for agency ar-
guments regarding the monitoring and control of
managerial activities (e.g., Fama, 1980; Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). Barkema and Gomez-Mejia (1998)
noted that 50 years of scholarship has yielded
weak, and often contradictory, findings regarding
traditional agency-theoretic arguments that share-
holders must use disciplining mechanisms to align
executive incentives with corporate performance.
Our findings suggest an alternative governance
mechanism that is based on the attributions of man-
agers and boards of directors rather than on organ-
izational constraints imposed by outsiders. Be-
cause controlling mechanisms rooted in CEO
performance attributions are internally imposed by
a CEO rather than externally imposed by share-
holders, CEO certifications may supplement tradi-
tional governance mechanisms by inducing attribu-
tions of competence that evolve into expectations
for higher performance. Disciplining mechanisms
that are partially endogenous to how CEOs and
boards explain the performance of their companies
have been largely ignored in the corporate control
literature. Our results suggest that exploring such
mechanisms more fully may be a useful line of fu-
ture research into manager-shareholder alignment.
Overall, our results provide cautionary informa-
tion for corporate pay policies. Given that CEO
certifications do not appear to have a short-term
beneficial effect on future profitability, the argu-
ment that boards of directors should pay exorbitant
levels of compensation to attract and retain star
CEOs whose firms have performed well in the past
may be somewhat misplaced, especially given the
heightened investor expectations that also seem to
come with star status. However, boards of directors
might be able to mitigate these costs by making pay
more dependent on future performance. In this
way, companies could reduce the degree to which
they “overpay” for star CEOs when actual corporate
performance fails to meet expectations. Ironically,
the overconfidence that past success creates may
provide an endogenous mechanism through which
boards can attenuate the winner-take-all effect
identified by Frank and Cook (1995). Of course, one
limitation of our study is that we could not distin-
guish whether the greater sensitivity of pay to per-
formance for certified CEOs resulted from boards
holding star CEOs more responsible for firm out-
comes or from star CEOs agreeing to more demand-
ing compensation contracts out of hubris. We
suspect that both of these processes occur simulta-
neously. However, qualitative or survey research
that delves more deeply into the black box sur-
rounding compensation setting would be useful in
untangling these dynamics more completely.
Future research might also address the effect of
certification on CEOs when they switch firms. It
would be consistent with our theoretical frame-
work that when star CEOs accept jobs at different
firms, they receive pay premiums or more struc-
tural power. Certification contests might be an im-
portant source of information about a CEO, since
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the boards doing the hiring may not have much
direct experience with CEO candidates. Thus, win-
ning a certification contest may be an even stronger
signal to the labor market outside of a CEO’s own
firm. Future research might also address whether
certification has an impact on other top manage-
ment team members. Top management team mem-
bers who have worked for celebrity CEOs may be
paid compensation premiums or be more likely to
be hired as CEOs at other firms. Then again, team
members who move into CEO positions elsewhere
may face very high expectations and have shorter
honeymoon periods. Exploring these research
questions will help shed light on where—and how
brightly—a celebrity CEO’s star shines.
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